Hall XI · 1976 – Present

Modern Cryptography

Different cryptographic tasks, constructions and security assumptions

The earlier halls distinguish cryptanalytic breaks, operational misuse, obsolescence, and unresolved systems; a correctly used one-time pad remains unbreakable. The constructions here serve different purposes. DES and AES are symmetric block ciphers; DES is now unsafe because its 56-bit key is too small. RSA supports distinct public-key encryption and signature schemes, with appropriate encoding and padding such as OAEP and PSS. Diffie–Hellman is key agreement, and SHA-256 is a hash function. These building blocks explain encryption, shared-secret establishment, signatures, and integrity; none alone provides a complete secure system.

For the broader landscape — ChaCha20, ECDH, post-quantum standardisation, and the cipher-vs-protocol taxonomy — see the Modern Cryptography wing. For the design rule that underpins every card in this hall, see Kerckhoffs's Principle.

Modern Era Mathematically Founded
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The museum’s closing lesson: Modern cryptography specifies security goals, attack models and assumptions. Public designs, suitable parameters and careful implementations matter together. Historical weaknesses do not imply that every classical system is broken, or that modern primitives are secure under every use.

Research case studies: what was actually attacked?

UA-8295: altered firmware and forensic evidence · SoDark: eight-round radio linking protection · NFC: authentication, configuration and counterfeit hardware

Compare GPU search, GPRS faults and conditional-linear DES. Each result identifies the target, attacker access and limits of the evidence.

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